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Abstract
Background: Proposals to expand Medicare coverage tend to be expensive, but the value of
services purchased is not known. This study evaluates the efficiency of the average private
supplemental insurance plan for Medicare recipients.
Methods: Data from the National Health Interview Survey, the National Death Index, and the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey were analyzed to estimate the costs, changes in life expectancy,
and health-related quality of life gains associated with providing private supplemental insurance
coverage for Medicare beneficiaries. Model inputs included socio-demographic, health, and health
behavior characteristics.
Parameter estimates from regression models were used to predict quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs) and costs associated with private supplemental insurance relative to Medicare only.
Markov decision analysis modeling was then employed to calculate incremental cost-effectiveness
ratios.
Results: Medicare supplemental insurance is associated with increased health care utilization, but
the additional costs associated with this utilization are offset by gains in quality-adjusted life
expectancy. The incremental cost-effectiveness of private supplemental insurance is approximately
$24,000 per QALY gained relative to Medicare alone.
Conclusion: Supplemental insurance for Medicare beneficiaries is a good value, with an
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio comparable to medical interventions commonly deemed
worthwhile.
Background
Medicare, the national health insurance program for the
elderly in the U.S., consists of various plans or "parts [1]".
Part A covers hospitalization costs and has no premium,
but limits and deductibles apply. Part B covers outpatient
care and requires a small monthly fee as well as a deduct-
ible. Limited prescription drug coverage will be added in
2006, but medications, co-payments, and deductible costs
presently create a large and growing private market for
Medicare supplemental insurance [2]. Retirees without
access to supplemental insurance as a work-related benefit
may choose to purchase Medicare supplemental insur-
ance out-of-pocket, a phenomenon that may increase in
the near future [3]. However, about 15% of elderly per-
sons forego private supplemental insurance policies, a
number that may increase as the cost of policies increase.
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There is evidence that elderly persons who lack private
supplemental insurance may be at increased risk of mor-
bidity and mortality [4,5]. Approximately 35% of the near
poor elderly lacking supplemental insurance either skip
doses or do not fill their prescriptions at all because they
cannot afford the medications they are prescribed. Medi-
care supplemental insurance may improve access to care
by reducing co-payments and medication costs, thereby
reducing barriers to timely care for acute but treatable ill-
nesses, chronic disease care, as well as preventive services.
Among younger cohorts, co-payments have been shown
to reduce utilization and possibly increase mortality [6-9].
Though improved access to medical care appears to confer
health benefits, there is considerable uncertainty as to
whether these benefits are worth their cost.
For the government, sensible decision-making requires an
understanding of the health benefits associated with pur-
chasing additional services. Much of the debate about the
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 has focused on its
overall cost in the face of large deficiencies in coverage
[2,10]. With more employers likely to withdraw from car-
rying retiree costs past the age of Medicare eligibility, and
the costs of insurance spiraling, greater numbers of older
Americans are likely to be underinsured. Despite a rapidly
growing budget, policymakers will likely be asked to con-
sider improving the package that Medicare offers.
Given the uncertainty surrounding the efficiency of Medi-
care supplemental insurance however, policymakers have
little rational basis upon which to design future Medicare
policy changes. Information on the cost-effectiveness of
the additional medical goods and services provided by a
supplemental policy to Medicare would provide a founda-
tion for evaluating Medicare reform initiatives. It also has
implications for estimating the cost-effectiveness of uni-
versal coverage proposals. To these ends, we conducted a
cost-effectiveness analysis of the average private supple-
mental insurance policy relative to Medicare alone. Such
an analysis, together with sensitivity analyses of key
parameters, may provide a benchmark with which to
assess the efficiency of other services and technologies
that vie for addition to the Medicare market basket.
Previous studies have examined the costs associated with
providing health insurance to younger cohorts [11]. Other
studies have examined the effectiveness of health insur-
ance in general [6-9]. In this study, we use a natural his-
tory Markov model to estimate the cost-effectiveness of
supplemental medical insurance among the elderly,
updating and amalgamating these earlier studies. Our
cohort consists of persons over the age of 65 who pres-
ently do or do not have insurance.
Methods
Overview and definitions
To estimate the expenditures and health effects of private
supplemental Medicare insurance to persons over age 65
relative to those who lack such coverage, we used a 3-step
process. First, we performed regression analyses on
nationally representative data of Medicare recipients with
private supplemental insurance. These analyses modeled
the effects of socio-demographic, behavioral and clinical
variables on expenditures, health-related quality of life
(HRQL) values, and mortality.
Those without supplemental insurance coverage differ in
socio-demographic characteristics from those that do
have coverage. We therefore apply the socio-demographic
characteristics of the uninsured to regression models of
insured persons. The use of the predictive functions of lin-
ear regression analysis allows for a better estimate of the
impact of providing supplemental insurance to the
uninsured.
Finally, using Markov decision analysis modeling that
incorporates the predicted costs and health benefits, we
estimated the cost-effectiveness of providing private sup-
plemental insurance to the average 65-year-old with
Medicare only coverage.
We use the quality-adjusted life year (QALY) as an out-
come measure. The QALY combines health-related quality
of life with life expectancy; one QALY represents a year of
life lived in perfect health [12,13]. In our analysis, the
incremental cost per QALY gained is the additional
money spent on supplemental health insurance divided
by the additional gains in quality-adjusted life expectancy.
This ratio is called the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio
(ICER). Our study was conducted from the societal per-
spective, employed a community derived measure of
HRQL to calculate effectiveness in terms of QALYs, and
used a 3% discount rate, following recommendations of
the Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine
[12]. We did not capture over-the counter drug costs, costs
associated with institutionalized persons, or direct non-
medical costs.
Health-related quality of life scores were derived from the
Health and Activities Limitation Index (HALex) [14]. The
HALex is comprised of two health domains, self-rated
health and role limitations. The HALex exhibits reasona-
ble validity, but because it captures only 2 health
domains, its sensitivity to the full spectrum of morbidity
is limited [15,16]. Details of these methods have been
published elsewhere [14].
The most recent publicly available nationally representa-
tive information on the relationships between health
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insurance and HRQL and mortality is the 1993 National
Health Interview Survey (NHIS) linked to the 1995
National Death Index [17,18]. We therefore used these
data to the to obtain prospective HRQL and mortality dif-
ferentials by private supplemental insurance coverage sta-
tus. We obtained costs from the 1996 Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) [11,19].
Regression analyses
We developed regression models using SUDAAN
(Research Triangle Park, NC) and STATA (College Station,
TX), adjusting for the complex sample designs used in
both NHIS and MEPS. In these models, HRQL scores, sur-
vival, or total medical expenditures were entered as
dependent variables. Age, race, ethnicity, gender, educa-
tion, family income (NHIS) or percent of federal poverty
level (MEPS), family size, marital status, behavioral risk
factors (smoking status and seatbelt use in NHIS),
number of conditions reported (NHIS) or self-rated
health (MEPS), and area of residence (region of country,
and urban or rural location) were entered as independent
variables. In the expenditure models (MEPS), only per-
sons whose insurance status did not change throughout
the year were included.
We estimated the effects of the socio-demographic and
health variables upon HRQL scores using linear regres-
sion. Expenditures were analyzed using generalized linear
regression models with a gamma distribution and a log
link function (to account for the skewed distribution of
expenditures). The resulting parameter estimates from the
analyses using those with private supplemental insurance
were used to calculate predicted HRQL scores and expen-
ditures for those with Medicare only using their socio-
demographic, behavioral and health characteristics. The
predicted expenditures were adjusted to include adminis-
trative costs for health insurance plans. All costs were
deflated to constant 1994 dollars using the medical por-
tion of the consumer price index.
Proportional hazard models were used to estimate the risk
of death due to lacking private supplemental health
insurance.
Decision analysis models and sensitivity analyses
We examined these costs and benefits over the lifetime of
the average 65-year-old using a Markov decision analysis
model using DATA Professional 4.0 (TreeAge Software,
Williamstown, MA). Our models evaluated two possible
events: giving private supplemental insurance to those
lacking it, or receiving only Medicare parts A and B. For
each health state, subjects were exposed to an annual, age-
specific risk of death, with survivors gaining one HRQL-
adjusted year and medical costs. The values for these year-
to-year changes in health by insurance status were
obtained from our regression analyses. Thus, the average
cost of medical care for a 65 year-old given private supple-
mental insurance is tabulated and the model is advanced
one year. Age-specific mortality rates are used to deter-
mine the proportion of subjects dying, and survivors are
assigned a discounted QALY and costs for the next year.
This process is repeated until over 99% of the subjects are
dead. The same process is applied to the Medicare only
cohort, and incremental values are calculated.
The variables used in our analyses were subjected to a
Monte Carlo simulation and 1-way sensitivity analyses. In
a 1-way analysis, all variables are held constant but one.
In a Monte Carlo simulation, values for all variables are
randomly sampled from a statistical distribution [20]. In
our Monte Carlo simulation, we used a triangular distri-
bution. In this distribution, the base-case estimate is
entered as the most likely value and values between the
high and low value are linearly interpreted. The assump-
tions of the analyses are listed in Table 1.
The decision analysis models were validated by compar-
ing their outputs with abridged health-adjusted life tables
we generated using spreadsheets [21]. Markov modeling
allows for a more accurate estimation of year-to-year
effects by accounting for the effect of mortality on cost
Table 1: Principal assumptions of the analysis.
Subjects will remain in stated insurance category. We did not have information on whether subjects continuously or intermittently lacked private 
supplemental insurance in all datasets.
Administrative costs associated with private supplemental insurance companies are the only relevant costs. It was assumed that costs associated with 
provider and hospital administration of supplemental policies and employer administrative costs would be negligible.
Private supplemental insurance company administrative costs are proportionate to expenditures. We calculated administrative costs using an expenditure 
driven formula [see Additional file 1].
We included all relevant covariates in our regression models. It is possible that unmeasured variables explain the observed effects of insurance on costs, 
mortality, and HRQL.
Expenditures included in the MEPS survey reflect all relevant costs. The costs reported in the MEPS do not include the institutionalized population, over-
the-counter (OTC) medications, or alternative care.
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and effectiveness. It also simplifies sensitivity analyses.
Abridged life tables allow for clear and simple estimations
of changes in life expectancy when different interventions
are applied and may thus serve to validate Markov
models.
Detailed descriptions of the data sources, regression mod-
els, and the decision analysis models are available [see
Additional file 1].
Results
Hazard ratio estimates were unstable when the behavioral
risk factors were included since including them reduced
the sample size. However, behavioral risk factors exerted
little effect on differences in mortality by insurance status.
For our base-case analysis, we therefore used the larger
sample, excluding the behavioral risk factors, but reduced
the obtained adjusted hazard ratios by 10% [see Addi-
tional file 1].
Table 2: Relationship between private supplemental insurance, selected utilization, and expenditures in the 1996 Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey.
Medicare only Private supplemental insurance
Physician office visits 6.7 8.3
Physician office visit expenditures $415 $745
Prescriptions filled 16.5 19.4
Prescription expenditures $565 $722
Out-of-pocket prescription expenditures $419 $371
Insurance prescription expenditures $6 $333
Table 3: Observed and predicted expenditures and health outcomes
Expenditures
Age-group Observed Private supplemental 
insurance
Observed Medicare only Predicted*
65–74 $4029 $3632 $4141
>75 $5942 $4243 $5919
Health-related quality of life score
65–74 0.78 0.71 0.73
>75 0.70 0.62 0.67
Mortality†
65–74 0.043 0.067 0.048
>75 0.083 0.129 0.092
*Values for effects of supplemental insurance on those with Medicare only using predictive regression models.
† Proportion dying within 24 months.
Table 4: Results of cost-effectiveness analyses at a 3% discount rate.




Cost per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) Gained
Medicare only $34,000 - 10.06 QALYs - -
Supplemental $56,000 $22,000 10.94 QALYs 0.88 QALYs $24,000
Cost per life year (LY) gained
Medicare only $34,000 13.26 LYs
Supplemental $56,000 $22,000 14.14 LYs 0.88 LYs $24,000
*Rounded to 2 decimal places.
†Rounded to nearest thousand dollars.
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In 1996 expenditures for persons with private supplemen-
tal insurance were higher than for those without private
supplemental insurance ($4915 vs. $3956). These higher
expenditures are reflected in greater utilization and pre-
scription use (Table 2).
Because of their lower socioeconomic status and lower
health status, the predicted medical expenditures among
those provided private supplemental insurance coverage
would be higher than those who currently have it (Table
3). The average cost of supplemental insurance coverage
would also be slightly higher ($1349 vs. $1270). Our
models also predict small improvements in HRQL, and
relatively larger improvements in mortality, but both
remain worse than those currently with private supple-
mental insurance (Table 3).
Providing lifetime private supplemental insurance to the
average 65-year-old would cost society an additional
$22,000 and would produce a gain of 0.88 QALY – an
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of $24,000 per
QALY gained (Table 4).
Sensitivity and sub-analyses
Table 5 lists the results of one-way sensitivity analyses on
ICERs. Over a plausible range of high and low values, pre-
dicted administrative costs exerted the greatest effect on
the incremental cost-effectiveness of supplemental health
insurance, resulting in a range of values from $21,000 per
QALY gained to $41,000 per QALY gained. In the Monte
Carlo analyses, 95% confidence interval of the ICER val-
ues for private supplemental insurance relative to Medi-
care only ranged from $12,000 to $36,000 per QALY
gained. The Markov model and spreadsheet produced
similar quality-adjusted life expectancy differentials
between groups.
Figure 1 shows the effects of providing private supplemen-
tal insurance at different ages. There is generally a trend
toward increasing cost-effectiveness with age.
Finally, to estimate the effect of medical inflation under
the assumption that health care becomes no more effec-
tive over time, we examined the ICER of private supple-
mental insurance in 2001 dollars. With effectiveness held
constant, inflation has a differential effect of the cost of
medical care for the insured relative to the uninsured,
increasing the ICER to $30,000 per QALY gained.
Discussion
Our models predict that the average private supplemental
insurance plan provided to Medicare recipients is associ-
ated with substantial health benefits. Because health
insurance increases the utilization of an array of medical
goods and services, the impact of providing private sup-
plemental insurance to the elderly is predicted to be rela-
tively large, improving life expectancy in the population
by about 11 months.
The ICER of private supplemental insurance is smaller
than many medical interventions employed in day-to-day
practice [22]. Moreover, incremental expenditures would
be considerably lower than investments in many other
well accepted social programs (e.g., airline and automo-
bile safety) per life year gained [23].
The cost-effectiveness of supplemental insurance appears
to increase with age (see Figure 1). This may reflect the
increasing absolute net benefit of medical care
interventions with increasing age; that is, as the absolute
risk of mortality increases with most conditions with
increasing age, so the potential absolute net benefit of
treating those conditions also increases. The slight
decrease in cost-effectiveness at age 70 is likely due to ran-
dom error, as the sample sizes in each age-group become
Table 5: Variables included in the decision analysis model, their assigned high, low, and baseline values, and the effect on the 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of insurance relative to no insurance.
Used in Model* Effect on ICER
Variable Baseline High Low High Low
Administrative costs 5% 25% 0% $41,000 $21,000
Hazard Ratio 1.5 1.75 1.25 $19,000 $37,000
Discount rate 3% 5% 0% $26,000 $23,000
Error in cost† 0% 125% 0.75% $39,000 10,000
* All values represent the percentage change in the baseline value except for the hazard ratio, which was varied from previously published estimates 
to the high value observed in logistic regression analysis [see Additional file 1].
†Variability in the cost estimate for the supplemental Medicare insurance. The baseline cost is multiplied by an error term ranging from 0.75 to 1.25.
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progressively smaller. Also, the mean expenditures of
those in the sample in the age-group without supplemen-
tal insurance was notably higher than that of persons in
older and younger age-groups.
Our analyses are susceptible to at least two main contra-
vening biases. First, persons who choose to purchase pri-
vate supplemental insurance may be more health
oriented, and it is that orientation, not insurance, that is
associated with improved outcomes. Second, and con-
versely, persons may purchase private supplemental
insurance because they perceive themselves to be at higher
health risk than is captured in the covariates we used. To
control for health orientation, we included two behavio-
ral risk factors, seatbelt use and smoking status, as covari-
ates. However, risky health behavior can be quite
nuanced. For example, there is evidence that persons with
greater medical skepticism are less likely to have health
insurance, have lower health care utilization, and have
higher mortality [24,25]. Thus, the use of a cost-effective-
ness ratio potentially mitigates some of these biases; those
without supplemental insurance may have worse health
habits and thus worse outcomes even if insured, but they
may also be less likely to utilize health care even if they are
given supplemental insurance – thereby generating lower
costs than predicted [24,25]. It should be noted that in
this single observational study one cannot be certain of
the extent of the possible contravening biases, so that net
bias may remain in the estimates used.
There are other notable limitations to our analyses. First,
the data sources we used, though they are the most recent
publicly available nationally representative samples, are
somewhat dated. While the costs of medical care have out-
paced general inflation, the effectiveness of medical inter-
ventions has also increased. The net effects of these
changes are uncertain. However, even if effectiveness
showed no improvement, the ratio would increase to just
$30,000 per QALY gained in 2001 dollars.
Second, as suggested by Table 2, private supplemental
insurance coverage is associated with both higher utiliza-
tion of ambulatory care and greater prescription use. The
analyses reflect the predicted impact of an average private
supplemental insurance policy and do not provide infor-
mation about the effects of specific components. The
recent controversy over the decision to provide limited
Medicare coverage for lung reduction surgery suggests that
insurance coverage decisions will increasingly have to deal
more explicitly with both the benefits and costs of specific
components of health care [26].
Our analysis rests on two major assumptions. First, pri-
vate supplemental insurance increases utilization of
Changes in the incremental cost-effectiveness (ICER) of providing private supplemental insurance to those with Medicare at different agesFigur  1
Changes in the incremental cost-effectiveness (ICER) of providing private supplemental insurance to those with Medicare at 
different ages.
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healthcare. Second, this increased utilization results in
improved health. Interestingly, our data suggest that pri-
vate supplemental insurance produces little improvement
in health-related quality of life, with both incremental life
expectancy and quality adjusted life expectancy rounding
out to 0.88 (Table 4). It is unlikely that the risks of medi-
cal care among the living elderly (e.g., impotence second-
ary to anti-hypertensive medications) outweigh the
benefits conferred by this care (e.g., reduced stroke due to
anti-hypertensive medications). This is an area that
requires further study.
Summarizing these limitations, we acknowledge that nei-
ther this study nor any individual study using observa-
tional data may adequately address the problems of
endogeneity (in econometric terms) or confounding (in
epidemiological terms) or establish causality. Additional
studies are needed using different datasets and different
approaches. Within the econometric framework, studies
employing propensity scores or instrumental variables (if
good instruments can be found) may yield less biased esti-
mates of the effects described here. Within an epidemio-
logical framework, studies using a broader array of
potential confounders may also be helpful. Finally, other
study designs employing quasi-experimental methods
may be helpful: for example examining the effects of
involuntary loss of insurance coverage, or comparing
costs and outcomes for persons with more generous cov-
erage provided as a result of prior employment (rather
than current choice) to those with less generous coverage.
Until such studies are available, the results reported here
should be seen as providing a starting-point to examine
the incremental cost-effectiveness of specific proposed
additions to the overall Medicare package.
Conclusion
Our analyses are not intended to suggest that expanding
private supplemental health insurance plans is the most
efficient means of improving health outcomes. A simple
expansion of Medicare benefits targeted at covering med-
ication costs and reducing inpatient co-payments may be
less expensive. The General Accounting Office and Con-
gressional Budget Office, for instance, has found that gov-
ernment programs may offer substantial savings in
administrative costs over private sector plans [27,28]. Our
analysis does suggest, however, that expanding supple-
mental health insurance for the elderly may be relatively
cost-effective, with a cost-effectiveness ratio similar to that
of younger cohorts [29].
Competing interests
The author(s) declare that they have no competing
interests.
Authors' contributions
PF conducted the regression analyses and made major
contributions to the development of the manuscript. PM
conducted Markov and sensitivity analyses and made
major contributions to the development of the manu-
script. MG provided guidance for the study and contrib-
uted to the development of the manuscript.
Additional material
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank all of those who helped us in developing this study. 
Special thanks to Howard Berliner for advice on the direction of the study. 
Willard Manning provided inestimable help in suggesting optimal 
approaches to modeling costs.
References
1. Iglehart JK: The American health care system – Medicare. N
Engl J Med 1999, 340(4):327-332.
2. Iglehart JK: The new Medicare prescription-drug benefit – a
pure power play. N Engl J Med 2004, 350(8):826-833.
3. Pear R: Agency to allow insurance cuts for the retired. The New
York Times. New York 2004:A1-A20.
4. Doescher MP, Franks P, Banthin JS, Clancy CM: Supplemental
insurance and mortality in elderly Americans. Findings from
a national cohort. Arch Fam Med 2000, 9(3):251-257.
5. Landerman LR, Fillenbaum GG, Pieper CF, Maddox GL, Gold DT,
Guralnik JM: Private health insurance coverage and disability
among older Americans. J Gerontol B Psychol Sci Soc Sci 1998,
53(5):S258-266.
6. Baker DW, Sudano JJ, Albert JM, Borawski EA, Dor A: Lack of
health insurance and decline in overall health in late middle
age. N Engl J Med 2001, 345(15):1106-1112.
7. Franks P, Clancy CM, Gold MR: Health insurance and mortality.
Evidence from a national cohort. JAMA 1993, 270(6):737-741.
8. Insuring America's Health: Principles and
Recommendations  [http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10874.html]
9. Sorlie PD, Johnson NJ, Backlund E, Bradham DD: Mortality in the
uninsured compared with that in persons with public and pri-
vate health insurance. Arch Intern Med 1994, 154(21):2409-2416.
10. Iglehart JK: Prescription-drug coverage for Medicare
beneficiaries. N Engl J Med 2003, 349(10):923-925.
11. Hadley J, Holahan J: How much medical care do the uninsured
use, and who pays for it? Health Aff (Millwood) 2003:W3-66-81.
12. Gold M, Siegel J, Russell L, Weinstein M: Cost-effectiveness in
health and medicine. New York: Oxford University Press; 1996. 
13. Muennig P: Designing and Conducting Cost-Effectiveness
Analyses in Medicine and Health Care. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass; 2002. 
14. Erickson P, Wilson R, Shannon I: Years of healthy life. In Statistical
Notes Washington, DC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
1995. 
15. Greenacre M: Correspondence analysis in practice. London:
Academic Press; 1993. 
16. Gold MR, Franks P, McCoy KI, Fryback DG: Toward consistency
in cost-utility analyses: using national measures to create
condition-specific values. Med Care 1998, 36(6):778-792.
Additional File 1
Technical appendix. Is health insurance cost-effective? A technical appen-
dix that describes methodology in more detail and provides additional data 
that might be of interest to readers.
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1472-
6963-5-23-S1.pdf]
Publish with BioMed Central   and  every 
scientist can read your work free of charge
"BioMed Central will be the most significant development for 
disseminating the results of biomedical research in our lifetime."
Sir Paul Nurse, Cancer Research UK
Your research papers will be:
available free of charge to the entire biomedical community
peer reviewed and published immediately upon acceptance
cited in PubMed and archived on PubMed Central 
yours — you keep the copyright
Submit your manuscript here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/publishing_adv.asp
BioMedcentral
BMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:23 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/23
Page 8 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
17. National Health Interview Survey  [http://www.cdc.gov/nchs]
18. National Death Index  [http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/r&d/ndi/ndi.htm]
19. Medical Expenditure Panel Survey  [http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
r&d/ndi/ndi.htm]
20. Halpern EF, Weinstein MC, Hunink MG, Gazelle GS: Representing
both first- and second-order uncertainties by Monte Carlo
simulation for groups of patients. Med Decis Making 2000,
20(3):314-322.
21. Muennig PA, Gold MR: Using the years-of-healthy-life measure
to calculate QALYs. Am J Prev Med 2001, 20(1):35-39.
22. The CEA Registry  [http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/cearegistry/]
23. Tengs TO, Adams ME, Pliskin JS, Safran DG, Siegel JE, Weinstein MC,
Graham JD: Five-hundred life-saving interventions and their
cost-effectiveness. Risk Anal 1995, 15(3):369-390.
24. Fiscella K, Franks P, Clancy CM: Skepticism toward medical care
and health care utilization. Med Care 1998, 36(2):180-189.
25. Fiscella K, Franks P, Clancy CM, Doescher MP, Banthin JS: Does
skepticism towards medical care predict mortality? Med Care
1999, 37(4):409-414.
26. Kolata G: Newest Treatments Create a Quandary On Medi-
care Costs. New York Times. New York 2003:1.
27. GAO: Canadian health insurance: lessons for the United
States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accounting Office; 1991. 
28. CBO: Single-payer and all-payer health insurance systems
using Medicare's payment rates. Washington, DC: Congres-
sional Budget Office; 1993. 
29. Muennig P, Franks P, Gold MR: The cost-effectiveness of health
insurance. Am J Prev Med 2005, 28(1):59-64.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed
here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/23/prepub
